MADRID, 27 Mar. (EUROPA PRESS) –
The judicial reform proposed by the Government of Israel, led by Benjamin Netanyahu and made up of various ultra-Orthodox and ultra-right parties, has unleashed a wave of demonstrations in recent weeks that have drastically raised internal tensions and threatens to cause the collapse of the coalition , in the face of threats from ‘Bibi’s’ partners to withdraw their support if he suspends the legislative processes to move it forward.
The proposal, promoted by the Minister of Justice, Yariv Levin, has among its main nuclei giving Parliament greater control over the judicial apparatus, which has been denounced as an attempt by the coalition to take advantage of its dominance of the Knesset to affect the justice system.
Thus, the Institute for Democracy in Israel explains that the “explicit objective” of the proposal is to “weaken the capacity of the judicial apparatus to supervise the action of the executive and legislative branches”, which could endanger the democratic system and the civil liberties in the country.
The main points of the reform revolve around a clause, known as the ‘invalidation clause’, which would turn Supreme Court rulings on legislation passed by the Knesset into a “recommendation” that Parliament could ignore if the court rule that the law is “unconstitutional”.
Israel does not have a formal Constitution and has a battery of Basic Laws that regulate the separation of powers and that the Supreme Court uses as a starting point when determining whether the laws approved by Parliament conform to this legal framework or presuppose a violation thereof.
Currently, the Supreme Court can declare a law “unconstitutional” and prevent its entry into force, although the reform proposal removes this authority from the court and allows the Knesset — and therefore the party or coalition to count with the most seats– skip this hurdle.
This point has undergone various changes since the beginning of the proposal and has come to contemplate that this clause allows the law to be maintained in its original wording, completely ignoring the pronouncement of the Supreme Court, in the event that a simple majority of 61 of the 120 parliamentarians vote to keep it standing.
Criticism regarding the “invalidation clause” revolves around the fact that it would mean eliminating the control of the Judiciary over the Executive Branch -which came out of the polls- and the Legislative Branch -where the electoral result is reflected-, which it would imply the end of control systems and the separation of powers in Israel.
The second aspect of this controversial proposal involves the introduction of changes to the appointment of the members of the Judicial Appointments Committee to give the Executive the authority to appoint the members of the Supreme Court.
The appointment of judges in Israel is in the hands of the aforementioned body, which can also dismiss magistrates. The Judicial Appointments Committee is made up of two ministers, two parliamentarians, three Supreme Court judges, and two representatives of the Bar Association.
Currently, the votes of seven of the nine members are necessary to name a candidate, which means that politicians cannot achieve successful nominations without the support of the judges, which has led to the need to reach a consensus to draw forward the proposals.
The current system was implemented in 1953, when the Government and the Knesset relinquished their powers to appoint judges, which until then depended on the recommendation of the Ministry of Justice and Parliament’s ratification of the Government’s proposal in the case of members of the Supreme Court.
However, the reform contemplates drastic changes in this model that gives politicians, and specifically the ruling coalition, a decisive vote in appointments, a measure that some members of the Government want to extend to the judges of all the courts in the country and not only to the Supreme.
Thus, it seeks to give control of the Judicial Appointments Committee to the government party or coalition, which could also order the dismissal of judges in all courts, since the aforementioned body has the authority to do so, without the need for a consensus with the representatives of the apparatus. judicial.
The third leg of the reform proposed by the Netanyahu government contemplates the cancellation of the so-called “extreme irrationality standard” to which the Supreme Court can resort to intervene in executive orders, amid criticism from the coalition against the court for allegedly exceed their powers to block the activities of the Executive.
The Institute for Democracy in Israel highlights on its website that this concept of “extreme irrationality standard” is intended to “prevent a government from passing totally arbitrary decisions” and not “to replace the decision-making powers of the government with those of the courts”.
On the contrary, Levin himself maintained when announcing the reform proposal that the Israelis “go to the polls, vote, and from time to time people who have not been elected make the decisions”, referring to the interventions that the government may have had. Supreme Court to paralyze laws considered unconstitutional according to the parameters of the set of Basic Laws.
In addition, the reform contemplates changes to make it difficult or impossible for a prime minister in office to be declared incapacitated, a point that the opposition describes as an attempt by the coalition to protect Netanyahu from the possibility that he is declared in conflict of interest. for the trial opened against him for alleged corruption.
This modification, already approved by Parliament, establishes that the prime minister may only be declared incapacitated by himself or by the Government, in case there is a two-thirds majority in the Council of Ministers, although this vote should be supported by a ‘super majority’ in the Knesset, which makes this possibility extremely difficult and rules it out in the case of the current president.
In fact, Israel’s attorney general, Gali Baharav-Miara, warned Netanyahu last week that his intention to participate in the reform “is illegal” due to a “conflict of interest”, hours after ‘Bibi’ claimed that would be involved “personally” as a result of the approval of the aforementioned proposal in the Knesset.
Finally, the proposal seeks that the legal advisers of the ministries are nominated by the political parties, which could cause them to be more dependent on political pressure. Currently, legal advisors are appointed after a bidding process, although the Executive seeks that they be appointed by the general directors of the letters, considering that they are “positions of trust.”
The opposition denounces that this route would turn these advisers into appendages of the parties that control the ministries, instead of independent public figures destined to give legal opinions on the actions adopted by the ministries and who are subordinate to the General Prosecutor’s Office.
For this reason, the Institute for Democracy in Israel explains that this situation would imply that, once proposals are presented by the ministries, it cannot be assumed that they have been adequately analyzed and in line with the laws of the country, including the Laws Basic, since the door would be opened for them to pass without hindrance regarding the proposals of the parties.
